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ABSTRACT 
Selective contracting in health care involves contractual 
arrangements among insurers and health care providers that 
give covered individuals a financial incentive to obtain health 
care from a limited panel of providers. Although selective 
contracting has been an important strategy of health insurance 
plans for decades, it has only recently expanded to prescription 
drug coverage. Drug plans now create pharmacy networks that 
channel customers to in-network pharmacies. Pharmacies 
compete to be part of the networks by offering discounts on the 
drugs they sell to covered customers and drug plans. Although 
networks can lower prescription drug costs for drug plans and 
consumers, opponents have argued that they also reduce access 
to care because consumers can only visit certain providers. In 
this Article, I use the principles of economic theory, the 
conclusions of previous empirical studies, the determinations of 
the FTC, and proprietary data I obtained from the largest 
pharmacy benefit manager in the United States to analyze both 
the claims in support of pharmacy networks and the arguments 
against them. I find that pharmacy networks significantly lower 
the cost of prescription drugs for drug plans and consumers. 
Moreover, pharmacy networks have almost no effect on most 
consumers’ access to pharmacies; the overwhelming majority of 
consumers live near retail pharmacies that are included in 
exclusive pharmacy networks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Selective contracting in health care involves contractual 
arrangements among insurers and health care providers that 
give covered individuals a financial incentive to obtain health 
care from a limited panel of providers.1 Although insurance 
plans such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and 
preferred provider organizations (PPOs) have engaged in 
selective contracting for decades,2 only recently has the practice 
expanded to prescription drug plans.3 The drug plans form 
exclusive arrangements with retail pharmacies that promise to 
                                                          
 1. Jill A. Marsteller et al., The Resurgence of Selective Contracting 
Restrictions, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1133, 1134 (1997) (“The central 
premise behind selective contracting is that managed care organizations 
(MCOs) can provide high quality care at a lower cost than traditional 
indemnity insurance plans by limiting the number and balancing the types of 
providers that plan enrollees may visit.”). 
 2. Id. at 1136–37. 
 3. See, e.g., A Bill for an Act Relating to Prescription Drugs, Hearing on  
H.B. No. 65 H.D. 1 Before the H. Comm. on Consumer Prot. & Commerce, 27th 
Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (statement of Gary M. Slovin et al., 
Walgreens) [hereinafter Statement of Slovin et al.], available at 
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2013/testimony/HB65_HD1_TESTIMON
Y_CPC-JUD_02-27-13_.PDF. 
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steer insured individuals to in-network pharmacies.4 The 
pharmacies, eager to be part of an exclusive network that will 
offer significant sales, compete aggressively to be included in 
the network by offering price discounts for filling 
prescriptions.5 As a result, selective contracting can lower the 
cost that both drug plans and consumers pay for prescription 
drugs.6 
Although pharmacy networks can reduce prescription drug 
costs for drug plans and consumers, these savings come at the 
expense of the retail pharmacies that must either offer price 
discounts to be part of exclusive networks or lose sales by not 
being included in the networks.7 As a result, pharmacy 
representatives have alleged various harms created by 
pharmacy networks.8 Some have argued that the networks 
reduce consumers’ access to care by limiting their choice of 
pharmacies.9 Others have suggested that smaller independent 
pharmacies may be excluded from networks.10 Responding to 
these arguments, many states and the federal government 
have enacted regulations that limit the ability of health 
                                                          
 4. See Michael G. Vita, Regulatory Restrictions on Selective Contracting: 
An Empirical Analysis of “Any Willing Provider” Regulations, 20 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 955, 955–56 (2001) (“[M]anaged care plans as conventionally defined 
almost always provide enrollees with some financial incentive to obtain health 
care services from a limited panel of providers.”). 
 5. Cf. Michael A. Morrisey, Competition in Hospital and Health 
Insurance Markets: A Review and Research Agenda, 36 HEALTH SERVICES 
RES. 191, 192 (2001) (“The general theory is that managed care introduces 
price competition into health services markets. Such competition among 
hospitals, physicians, and other providers results in lower prices, or at least 
less rapidly increasing prices for services.”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1163. 
 8. Press Release, Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, Community 
Pharmacists Endorse Bipartisan Pharmacy Competition and Consumer 
Choice Act (May 24, 2011) [hereinafter Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n], 
available at http://www.ncpanet.org/index.php/news-releases/2011-news-
releases/994-community-pharmacists-endorse-bipartisan-pharmacy-
competition-and-consumer-choice-act. 
 9. See, e.g., DAVID BALTO & JAMES KOVACS, NEW AM. FOUND., 
INCREASING COMPETITION AND CHOICE: AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED 
MEDICARE REGULATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS 
AND CARE 2 (2014), available at http://mipa.ms/wp-content/uploads/2014/
03/naf.Balto-Policy-Paper.pdf. 
 10. Id. at 3. 
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insurers and/or prescription drug plans to contract 
selectively.11 
In this Article, I use the principles of economic theory, the 
findings from previous empirical studies, the conclusions of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and a proprietary dataset to 
analyze both the claims in support of pharmacy networks and 
the arguments against them. I obtained data from Express 
Scripts Holding Company, the nation’s largest pharmacy 
benefit manager (PBM)12 that manages over one billion 
prescriptions each year for more than 100 million people.13 No 
prior study has ever reported or analyzed this data or similar 
data from another PBM to explore how pharmacy networks 
work in practice.14 
I find that exclusive pharmacy networks reduce the prices 
for many drugs, leading to reductions in the overall spending 
on pharmaceuticals. When drug plans have the ability to 
exclude pharmacies from their network and steer patients 
elsewhere, pharmacies compete aggressively for selective 
contracts by offering price discounts for filling prescriptions.15 
In general, more exclusive networks produce greater 
competition because they promise to channel more patients to 
network pharmacies.16 As a result, more exclusive networks 
generate even steeper price discounts.17 Indeed, data from 
Express Scripts confirm that clients that choose more exclusive 
network options pay less for the prescription drug costs of their 
covered individuals.18 
                                                          
 11. Jonathan Klick & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of Any Willing 
Provider and Freedom of Choice Laws on Health Care Expenditures 5–8 (Univ. 
of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. For Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 12-39, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183279. 
 12. See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Natasha Singer, F.T.C. Approves Merger of 2 
of the Biggest Pharmacy Benefit Managers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/business/ftc-approves-merger-of-express-
scripts-and-medco.html. 
 13. See Corporate Profile, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=69641&p=irol-homeprofile (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); 
infra Part IV. 
 14. Based on the Author’s review of the literature and industry reports. 
 15. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Express Scripts, Standard Network Data (July 17, 2013) (unpublished 
spreadsheet) (on file with author); infra Part IV. 
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I also determine that concerns about consumers’ access to 
care are largely unfounded. Competition among drug plans and 
PBMs compels them to offer plan sponsors the amount of 
accessibility that consumers prefer; drug plans and PBMs that 
did not offer the desired level of accessibility would lose out in 
the competitive market.19 Moreover, consumers do not appear 
to value accessibility as much as they do lower prices; when 
confronted with different plan options that vary in their degree 
of provider choice and price, most consumers choose the options 
that offer fewer provider choices and a lower price.20 
Nevertheless, I conclude that pharmacy networks have almost 
no effect on most consumers’ access to pharmacies. Express 
Scripts’ data reveal that the overwhelming majority of 
consumers live near retail pharmacies that are included in 
exclusive pharmacy networks.21 In fact, the Express Scripts 
networks far exceed pharmacy convenience of access standards 
established by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS).22 Thus, well-designed pharmacy networks provide 
customer convenience and lower the cost of healthcare. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the history 
of selective contracting in both medical services and 
prescription drug coverage. It also explains the three basic 
forms of pharmacy networks: open networks, narrow networks, 
and preferred networks. Part II discusses challenges to 
selective contracting in prescription drug coverage. Most states 
and the federal government have enacted various laws that 
undermine pharmacy networks. Moreover, pharmacy groups 
continue to pursue litigation that aims to restrict exclusive 
pharmacy networks. In Part III, I analyze both the claims that 
                                                          
 19. See Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Patrick C. Lynch, R.I. 
Attorney Gen., and Juan M. Pichardo, Deputy Majority Leader, R.I. State 
Senate 4–5 (Apr. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from FTC to Lynch], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-
comment-hon.patrick-c.lynch-and-hon.juan-m.pichardo-concerning-
competitive-effects-ri-general-assembly-bills-containing-pharmaceutical-
freedom/ribills.pdf. 
 20. See Nancy Dean Beaulieu, Quality Information and Consumer Health 
Plan Choices, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 43, 60 (2002) (“[F]amilies seem to value the 
higher quality, lower price, smaller network combination offered by certain 
HMOs . . . .”); Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 5 (“Many employers 
offer a choice between higher cost, higher benefit plans, and lower cost, lower 
benefit plans, and many employees choose the latter.”). 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
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selective contracting will generate cost savings for prescription 
drugs and the arguments that exclusive networks reduce 
consumers’ access to care. Part IV presents a case study from 
Express Scripts Holding Company. I analyze Express Scripts’ 
data to describe various aspects of how pharmacy networks 
work in practice: the exclusivity of the networks, the cost 
savings generated by the networks, and consumers’ access to 
care under the networks. 
I. HISTORY OF SELECTIVE CONTRACTING                     
IN HEALTH CARE 
Since the advent of managed care in the 1980s, insurance 
companies have engaged in selective contracting to lower the 
price of health services.23 Health insurers created plans such as 
HMOs and PPOs that formed exclusive arrangements with 
health care providers that narrowed insured patients’ choices of 
providers for covered services.24 This selective contracting 
created intense competition among physicians, hospitals, and 
other health care providers as they competed for insurers’ 
contracts.25 To secure these contracts and the increased 
business they represented, providers offered health services at 
discounted prices.26 
The competition that results from selective contracting in 
health insurance is exactly what economic theory would 
predict.27 When insurers have the ability to exclude providers 
from their network and steer patients elsewhere, providers 
have significant incentives to compete aggressively for selective 
contracts.28 Obtaining an exclusive agreement with an insurer 
offers the possibility of significant customers and sales.29 
Health care providers compete for exclusive agreements by 
offering attractive services and lower prices.30 Indeed, a 
                                                          
 23. See Morrisey, supra note 5, at 192. 
 24. See Glenn A. Melnick et al., The Effects of Market Structure and 
Bargaining Position on Hospital Prices, 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 217, 217–18 
(1992). 
 25. Morrisey, supra note 5, at 192. 
 26. Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1134. 
 27. Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Morrisey, supra note 5, at 192–93 (“The general theory is that 
managed care introduces price competition into health services markets . . . . 
These lower prices, by the mechanism of insurance market competition, are 
2014] BENEFITS OF PHARMACY NETWORKS 1033 
 
substantial body of empirical research has shown that selective 
contracting by managed care plans such as HMOs and PPOs 
has lowered the prices that both insurers and patients pay for 
health care.31 
Selective contracting has now extended from medical 
services to prescription drug coverage.32 Just as physicians, 
hospitals, and other health care providers have competed to be 
part of exclusive networks of covered providers for over thirty 
years,33 pharmacies now compete to be included in exclusive 
networks of pharmacies.34 The justification of pharmacy 
networks is identical to the economic theory behind provider 
networks: exclusive arrangements between prescription drug 
plans and retail pharmacies promise to steer insured 
individuals to in-network pharmacies.35 The pharmacies, eager 
to be part of an exclusive network that will offer significant 
sales, compete aggressively to be included in the network by 
offering price discounts for filling prescriptions.36 
In practice, much of the negotiation with retail pharmacies 
about network inclusion and price discounts is handled by 
PBMs.37 PBMs contract with health plan sponsors to manage 
the prescription drug benefits of their members.38 To reduce 
prescription drug costs, PBMs assemble networks of retail 
pharmacies where the individuals covered by the prescription 
drug plan can fill prescriptions.39 The drug plans offer covered 
individuals significant financial incentives to fill prescriptions 
                                                          
passed on to purchasers in the form of lower health insurance premiums . . . . 
Arguably, decisions as to who gets contracts now depend on services . . . and 
price.”); Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4. 
 31. Morrisey, supra note 5, at 192. 
 32. See Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 2. 
 33. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text. 
 34. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 2. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., id. (“PBMs facilitate agreements among pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, retail pharmacies, and health plan sponsors. They engage in 
selective contracting to create networks of these providers, which in turn 
participate in specified plans to distribute health care services and 
pharmaceutical drugs to patients who subscribe to the plans.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 39. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF 
MAIL-ORDER PHARMACIES 1 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf. 
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at the network pharmacies; plans generally will not cover 
prescriptions filled at out-of-network pharmacies, and 
consumers often pay lower co-pays at preferred network 
pharmacies.40 And, because inclusion in a network generally 
leads to significant revenues for the pharmacies, pharmacies 
compete to be included in a PBM’s network by offering 
discounts to the PBM.41 Pursuant to contracts negotiated with 
plan sponsors, PBMs pass on these savings to reduce health 
plan costs and drug prices for consumers.42 Confirming the 
lower prices, an extensive FTC study of the PBM industry 
found that consumers covered by a PBM-administered drug 
plan pay significantly less for both brand name and generic 
drugs than do consumers without prescription drug 
insurance.43 
The attractiveness of any network to a provider—either 
heath care provider or pharmacy—depends critically on its 
exclusivity.44 The fewer competitors that are included in the 
network, the more customers and sales a particular provider or 
pharmacy can expect to receive.45 In contrast, individual 
providers or pharmacies would have no reason to bid 
aggressively to be part of a network that included all of the 
competitors in an area; customers would continue to visit their 
usual provider or pharmacy because their insurance plan 
would not give them any incentive to visit a different one.46 
PBMs and drug plans typically have a variety of networks that 
differ in their degree of exclusivity and, in turn, the prices that 
consumers and health plans pay for pharmaceuticals.47 
                                                          
 40. See id. at 9. 
 41. Id. at 3–4. 
 42. See id. at 8–9; Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4. 
 43. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at 36. 
 44. See id. at 5. 
 45. Id. (“Retail pharmacies generally will offer higher discounts to be in a 
more exclusive network, because each retail pharmacy will fill a larger 
percentage of prescriptions if fewer retail pharmacies are in the PBM’s 
network.”). 
 46. See Christine Piette Durrance, The Impact of Pharmacy-Specific Any-
Willing-Provider Legislation on Prescription Drug Expenditures, 37 ATLANTIC 
ECON. J. 409, 410–11 (2009). 
 47. See Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Terry G. Kilgore, Member, 
Commonwealth of Va. House of Delegates 5 (Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Letter 
from FTC to Kilgore], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-hon.terry-g.kilgore-
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These pharmacy networks take three basic forms: (1) open 
networks; (2) preferred networks; and (3) narrow or “limited” 
networks.48 Many pharmacy networks are “open networks” that 
are open to any pharmacy that agrees to offer basic discounts to 
the prescription drug plan and its members.49 In addition, 
many plans create a “preferred network” within the broader 
open network.50 To be part of the preferred network, 
pharmacies offer steeper discounts than the non-preferred 
pharmacies in the open network.51 Prescription drug plans, in 
turn, steer their members to the preferred pharmacies through 
lower co-pays and cost-sharing.52 Finally, some pharmacy 
networks are “narrow” or “limited” networks.53 In contrast to a 
preferred network, which is a subset within a broader open 
network, a narrow network is a stand-alone network of a 
limited number of pharmacies.54 Prescription drug plans will 
generally not cover prescriptions filled outside of the narrow 
network.55 As a result, pharmacies offer significant discounts to 
be part of narrow networks that require customers to fill 
prescriptions at in-network pharmacies.56 Thus, while 
pharmacies may offer discounts to be part of any pharmacy 
network, in general, the more exclusive the network, the larger 
the cost savings for both drug plans and consumers.57 
II. CHALLENGES FOR PHARMACY NETWORKS 
Exclusive pharmacy networks have generally been popular 
among drug plans and consumers, but controversial among 
                                                          
concerning-virginia-house-bill-no.945-regulate-contractual-relationship-
between-pharmacy-benefit-managers-and-both-health-benefit/v060018.pdf. 
 48. Visante, How Pharmacy Networks Could Save Medicare, Medicaid, 
and Commercial Payers $115 Billion, RXOBSERVER.COM, 4 (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.rxobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/visante-pcma-
pharmacy-networks-study-1-24-13.pdf. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.; see also Adam Fein, Walmart’s Booming Preferred Network 
Models, DRUG CHANNELS (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.drugchannels.net/2011/
08/walmarts-booming-preferred-network.html (“The consumer can choose any 
pharmacy, but pays a lower price at a Walmart pharmacy.”). 
 52. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 53. Visante, supra note 48, at 4. 
 54. Id. 
 55. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at 9. 
 56. Id. at 4–5. 
 57. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
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retail pharmacies.58 The networks lower prescription drug costs 
for drug plans and consumers, but these savings come at the 
expense of the retail pharmacies that must either offer price 
discounts to be part of exclusive networks or lose sales by not 
being included in the networks.59 As a result, pharmacy 
representatives have alleged various harms created by network 
pharmacies.60 Some pharmacy representatives have argued 
that the networks limit consumers’ access to their choice of 
pharmacies.61 Others have suggested that smaller and 
independent pharmacies may be the pharmacies excluded from 
networks.62 Consequently, many pharmacy groups have 
supported legislative efforts and pursued litigation to 
undermine pharmacy networks.63 In this Part, I discuss state 
and federal legislation and representative legal cases that aim 
to restrict exclusive pharmacy networks. 
A. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS 
In response to arguments from health providers and retail 
pharmacy representatives, many states have enacted 
regulations that limit the ability of health insurers and/or 
prescription drug plans to contract selectively.64 These laws fall 
into two related categories.65 “Any-willing-provider” (AWP) 
laws require plans to accept into their network any provider (or 
pharmacy) that is willing to accept the plan’s terms and 
conditions.66 For example, if a pharmacy agrees to the terms a 
prescription drug plan pays the pharmacies in its network, the 
plan must accept the pharmacy and pay it the same rate it 
pays the other network pharmacies. “Freedom-of-choice” (FOC) 
                                                          
 58. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at 5 (discussing how 
pharmacies have to offer discounts in order to be part of exclusive networks); 
supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 59. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at 5. 
 60. Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8. 
 61. BALTO & KOVACS, supra note 9, at 1–2; Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists 
Ass’n, supra note 8. 
 62. Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8. 
 63. See, e.g., Statement of Slovin et al., supra note 3; BALTO & KOVACS, 
supra note 9, at 1–2; Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8. 
 64. Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1134–35. 
 65. Vita, supra note 4, at 956. 
 66. Id. (“‘[A]ny-willing-provider’ (AWP) laws . . . compel managed care 
plans to accept into their networks any qualified provider who is willing to 
accept the plan’s terms and conditions . . . .”). 
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laws compel plans to reimburse providers (or pharmacies) for 
any service they provide, even if they are not in the plan’s 
network.67 Thus, under an FOC law, if a covered individual fills 
a prescription at a non-network pharmacy, the plan must pay 
the pharmacy the same rate that it would pay its network 
pharmacies. To the extent that the non-network pharmacy 
charges more than network pharmacies, the individual 
consumer must pay the difference.68 States have enacted AWP 
and FOC laws for decades, and most states now have some 
version of the laws in their insurance codes.69 
The purpose of AWP and FOC laws is to force both health 
insurers and prescription drug plans to do business with all 
providers.70 Although large pharmacy chains have sometimes 
lobbied for AWP and FOC laws to guarantee that they are not 
excluded from any pharmacy network,71 most of the support for 
the laws has come from independent and community 
pharmacies.72 Proponents of the laws argue that managed care 
plans and PBMs force many independent community providers 
out of the market because they only allow larger providers and 
pharmacy chains into their networks.73 They assert that 
excluding these smaller providers will reduce the quality of 
health care because smaller community providers deliver more 
personal comprehensive care.74 Proponents also argue that 
excluding providers from exclusive networks will increase drug 
prices as competition is reduced in the prescription drug 
market.75 
                                                          
 67. Id. 
 68. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 5. 
 69. Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1136. 
 70. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 5. 
 71. See Statement of Slovin et al., supra note 3. 
 72. See, e.g., Adam J. Fein, New York’s Anti-Mail Bill and the Coming 
Generic Price War, DRUG CHANNELS (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http://www.drugchannels.net/2011/12/new-yorks-anti-mail-bill-and-
coming.html; Devon M. Herrick, Reforming Arkansas’ Medicaid Drug 
Program, NAT’L CENTER FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ib137; Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8. 
 73. Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8. 
 74. Cathy McMorris Rodgers & Anthony Weiner, McMorris Rodgers and 
Weiner: Local Pharmacies Play Essential Role in Care, ROLL CALL (June 6, 
2011, 12:00 AM), www.rollcall.com/issues/56_133/local_pharmacies_play_
essential_role_care-206186-1.html. 
 75. See BALTO & KOVACS, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
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AWP and FOC laws take various forms in different 
states.76 Some laws only apply to specific providers, such as 
pharmacists or optometrists, while other states’ laws apply to 
all health care providers.77 Similarly, whereas many laws cover 
arrangements made by any health or drug plan, other states’ 
laws cover only networks of health care providers formed by 
HMOs or PPOs or networks of pharmacies developed by 
PBMs.78 
Federal policymakers, to a limited extent, have also been 
persuaded by the arguments against selective contracting. 
Congress included an AWP provision in Medicare Part D that 
requires Part D drug plans to permit the participation of any 
pharmacy that meets the terms of the plan.79 Recently, “The 
Pharmacy Competition and Consumer Choice Act of 2011” 
proposed similar legislation on the national level.80 Although 
never enacted, the bill would have put in place a federal AWP 
law that would prohibit plans from “exclud[ing] an otherwise 
qualified pharmacist or pharmacy from participation in a 
particular network provided that the pharmacist or 
pharmacy . . . accepts the terms, conditions and reimbursement 
rates . . . .”81 
B. LITIGATION 
Independent pharmacies have also filed numerous lawsuits 
to undermine the use of preferred and narrow networks. The 
claims generally name as defendant a state health department, 
a federal agency, or a drug plan that has established a 
pharmacy network. 
Many pharmacy associations and independent pharmacies 
have brought cases against state health departments, arguing 
that independent pharmacies have been excluded from the 
                                                          
 76. Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1134. 
 77. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 6. 
 78. Id. at 6–7. 
 79. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
BENEFIT MANUAL CHAPTER 5: BENEFITS AND BENEFICIARY PROTECTIONS 
50.8.1 (Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-
Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/MemoPDBManual
Chapter5_093011.pdf. 
 80. Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8. 
 81. H.R. 1971, 112th Cong. (2011); accord. S. 1058, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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network of pharmacies serving Medicaid patients.82 For 
example, the Florida Pharmacy Association and several 
independent Florida pharmacies have filed a lawsuit against 
the state’s Agency for Health Care Administration to force the 
state to include independent Florida pharmacies in the 
network of qualified Medicaid pharmacies.83 The claim argues 
that the Agency has entered into contracts with HMOs and 
other organizations that exclude independent and community 
Florida pharmacies from their Medicaid networks.84 The 
plaintiffs allege that, as a result, Medicaid patients can only fill 
prescriptions at pharmacies in the network that includes only 
CVS, Wal-Mart, and a select number of other pharmacies that 
are affiliated with other managed care organizations.85 The 
plaintiffs argue that exclusion of independent pharmacies from 
the Florida Medicaid State Health Plan is in violation of 
federal and state FOC requirements.86 
Other lawsuits have been aimed at the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the CMS challenging 
the lawfulness of the establishment under Medicare Part D of 
preferred pharmacy networks.87 For example, Southwest 
Pharmacy Solutions, an organization representing more than 
500 pharmacies in eight states, recently filed a claim arguing 
that the CMS wrongfully allowed insurers offering Part D 
plans to form preferred networks of pharmacies.88 The 
plaintiffs argued that the preferred networks exclude 
                                                          
 82. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Fla. Pharmacy Ass’n v. State of Fla., Agency 
for Health Care Admin., No. 2012-CA-002355 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 26, 2012), 
available at http://miamiherald.typepad.com/files/fpa-press-release-
lawsuit.pdf. 
 83. Id. at 1–2. 
 84. See id. at 2, 12–14. 
 85. Id. at 14, exhibit E. 
 86. Id. at 16–20. 
 87. See Sw. Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., 718 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 88. Carolina Bolado, Medicare, Medicaid Sued over Preferred Pharmacy 
Rule, LAW360 (July 11, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
257026/medicare-medicaid-sued-over-preferred-pharmacy-rule; see also 
Farmville Disc. Drug, Inc. v. Sebelius, 4:12-CV-109-D, 2013 WL 1246815, at *1 
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2013) (discussing how independent pharmacies sued the 
HHS and the CMS arguing that the Preferred Pharmacy Rule violated the 
AWP rule). 
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independent pharmacies, in violation of the Medicare Part D 
AWP provision.89 
Other suits involve claims between independent 
pharmacies and insurers that utilize preferred pharmacy 
networks.90 For example, specialty pharmacy MedfusionRx 
recently filed suit against insurer Aetna Inc., claiming the 
insurer excluded the pharmacy from its retail pharmacy 
network.91 MedfusionRx alleged that Aetna removed the 
pharmacy from its retail network and instead moved it to a 
different network with higher fees and lower reimbursement 
rates.92 The pharmacy claimed that because of this change, 
many of its former customers were no longer allowed to fill 
prescriptions at the pharmacy.93 MedfusionRx argued that 
excluding the pharmacy from the retail network is in violation 
of Mississippi AWP laws.94 
These and many other claims have had varying 
outcomes.95 Thus despite the widespread use of selective 
contracting in health care, the threat of litigation remains a 
challenge for drug plans utilizing preferred and narrow 
pharmacy networks. 
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SELECTIVE  
CONTRACTING IN PHARMACY NETWORKS 
Exclusive pharmacy networks are premised on the idea 
that selective contracting will generate cost savings for 
consumers and drug plans.96 However, opponents argue that 
exclusive networks reduce consumers’ access to care because 
                                                          
 89. Sw. Pharmacy Solutions, Inc., 718 F.3d at 439. 
 90. See MedfusionRx LLC v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 3:12CV00567, 2012 
WL 3619616, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 8, 2012). 
 91. Id.; see also Carolina Bolado, Aetna Hit with Suit over New Specialty 
Pharmacy Network, LAW360 (Aug. 9, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/368492/aetna-hit-with-suit-over-new-specialty-pharmacy-network 
(discussing the MedfusionRx lawsuit). 
 92. MedfusionRx LLC, 2012 WL 3619616, at *1. 
 93. Bolado, supra note 91. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Any Willing Provider Cases, Complaints and Legal Resources, 
INDEP. SPECIALTY PHARMACY COALITION, http://www.ispcoalition.org/awp-
cases.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
 96. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
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consumers can only visit certain providers.97 In this Part, I use 
the principles of economic theory, the findings from previous 
empirical studies, and the conclusions of the FTC to analyze 
both the claims in support of pharmacy networks and the 
arguments against them. 
A. THE EFFECT OF PHARMACY NETWORKS ON DRUG SPENDING 
Basic economic theory predicts the effect that selective 
contracting in pharmaceutical markets will have on drug prices 
and overall drug spending.98 Pharmacies will compete to be 
part of exclusive networks that will channel customers to 
network pharmacies.99 The more customer traffic directed 
towards pharmacies (which depends on both the number of 
covered customers and the exclusivity of the network), the 
more intensely pharmacies will compete to be part of the 
network.100 Pharmacies compete by offering discounts and 
other price concessions on the drugs they sell to covered 
customers and drug plans.101 Thus, economic theory predicts 
that exclusive pharmacy networks will lower the prices that 
consumers and plans pay for pharmaceuticals. 
The basic premise behind selective contracting in 
pharmaceutical markets can be seen in countless other 
markets. Consider the market for hotel rooms: the quoted rate 
for a customer booking one room is typically significantly 
higher than the rate quoted to a company or association that is 
booking a block of 300 rooms for an upcoming event.102 The 
                                                          
 97. See BALTO & KOVACS, supra note 9, at 1–3; cf. Letter from David A. 
Balto, Attorney at Law, to Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor, New York 3–4 (Oct. 
17, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Balto to Cuomo], available at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Sah4EJsVyKcJ:www.t
ruthrx.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/NY-AMMO-Letter-Cuomo.pdf+&cd=
1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (discussing how selective contracting is not 
beneficial to consumers because consumers value choice). 
 98. See Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4 (“An abundance of 
empirical evidence now exists demonstrating that, other things equal, 
selective contracting increases the intensity of competition among providers, 
which is manifested in lower prices paid by insurers to providers . . . . These 
findings conform to economic theory.”). 
 99. See supra Part I. 
 100. See supra Part I. 
 101. See supra Part I. 
 102. See generally, Woo Gon Kim & Stephen J. Hiemstra, Economic Hotel 
Room Pricing: A Multi-Stage Synthetic Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF 2003 
INTERNATIONAL CHRIE CONFERENCE 216 (Hailin Qu ed., 2003), available at 
1042 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
obvious reason for this price difference is that the hotel is 
willing to offer a price discount in order to secure 300 
reservations from the company or association members. 
Network pharmacies are no different than hotels in this 
example; pharmacies are willing to offer price discounts to 
secure customers covered by the drug plan.103 
The FTC has repeatedly reinforced the economic theory 
behind pharmacy networks: 
When insurers have a credible threat to exclude providers from 
their networks and channel patients elsewhere, providers have a 
powerful incentive to bid aggressively. Inclusion in a restricted 
panel offers the provider the prospect of substantially increased 
sales opportunities. Without such credible threats, however, 
providers have less incentive to bid aggressively, and even 
managed care organizations with large market shares may have 
less ability to obtain low prices.104 
The FTC has also explained how more exclusive networks 
generate even steeper price discounts.105 It has determined that 
health care providers compete more intensely to be part of a 
more restricted network: “HMOs, which have more limited 
panels than PPOs, induce more intense price competition 
among providers than would PPOs of equivalent size.”106 
Similarly, the FTC has concluded that more restrictive 
pharmacy networks generate more intense competition: “The 
more exclusive the network, the larger the discount retail 
pharmacies will offer, believing that greater exclusivity is 
likely to bring them more customers.”107 Network exclusivity 
“ensure[s] that the network can direct a sufficient patient 
volume to its providers to justify price concessions.”108 
Moreover, the FTC has indicated that AWP and FOC laws 
restricting selective contracting hurt consumers by raising the 
prices of pharmaceuticals: 
                                                          
http://m3.ithq.qc.ca/collection/00000144.pdf (discussing the rates of hotel 
rooms). 
 103. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 104. Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH 
CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION ch. 7, at 14 (2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf. 
 108. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 122 (1996). 
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FTC staff have expressed concerns about potential anticompetitive 
effects and consumer harms associated with AWP and FOC laws 
before. These laws can make it more difficult for health insurers or 
PBMs to negotiate discounts from providers; if plans cannot give 
providers any assurance of favorable treatment or greater volume 
in exchange for lower prices, then the incentive for providers to bid 
aggressively for the plan’s business—to offer better rates—is 
undercut. AWP and FOC laws also can limit competition by 
restricting the ability of insurance companies to offer consumers 
different plans, with varying levels of choice. These restrictions on 
competition may result in insurance companies paying higher fees 
to providers, which, in turn, generally results in higher premiums, 
and may increase the number of people without coverage.109 
Numerous empirical studies confirm that selective 
contracting reduces the price of health care services.110 Many 
studies have investigated the impact of selective contracting by 
managed care plans on the prices of health care services.111 In 
what is often regarded as one of the strongest studies of 
selective contracting by managed care plans, Melnick et al. 
examined the hospital transaction prices negotiated by a large 
California PPO.112 They found that the PPO was able to 
negotiate lower prices for health care services by channeling 
more patients to the network hospital; the larger the share of 
the hospital’s business accounted for by the PPO, the greater 
the leverage the PPO had with the hospital.113 The researchers 
also found that the PPO was able to negotiate lower prices for 
health services when there were more hospital competitors; in 
markets with more hospital competitors, the PPO is able to 
make a credible threat to channel its covered patients to 
another hospital.114 Thus, selective contracting by managed 
                                                          
 109. Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n, to James L. Seward, Senator, New 
York Senate 3 (Mar. 31, 2009) (citations omitted), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-
comment-honorable-james-l.seward-concerning-new-york-senate-bill-58-
pharmacy-benefit-managers-pbms/v090006newyorkpbm.pdf. 
 110. See, e.g., Morrisey, supra note 5, at 195–97. 
 111. See, e.g., id. at 191; cf. Vita, supra note 4, at 955–56 (finding that per 
capita health spending increased in states that passed stringent AWP or FOC 
laws); Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 4 (describing studies finding that 
AWP and FOC laws lead to increased health care expenditures). 
 112. See Melnick et al., supra note 24, at 217 (examining the “prices 
obtained in different types of markets by the largest PPO in California”). 
 113. Id. at 229–30. 
 114. Id. 
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care plans results in lower prices as providers bid aggressively 
to be part of an exclusive network.115 
Other studies have examined the impact of selective 
contracting in pharmacy networks on drug prices.116 A recent 
empirical study by health care consulting firm Visante found 
that preferred and narrow networks lower prescription costs for 
consumers because pharmacies will offer discounts to be in the 
more exclusive networks.117 Specifically, it found evidence that 
preferred networks lower prescription costs by an estimated 5% 
compared to open networks.118 Additionally, it found that 
pharmacies will offer the steepest discounts to be part of the 
most exclusive narrow networks.119 Compared to open 
networks, narrow networks can lower prescription costs by an 
estimated 10%.120 
Another recent analysis by the CMS examined Medicare 
Part D Prescription Drug Plans that have a preferred 
pharmacy network.121 The CMS found that prescription drug 
costs were approximately 6% lower at preferred pharmacies 
compared to non-preferred pharmacies.122 Moreover, the more 
potential customers the plans can channel to the preferred 
pharmacies, the greater the savings.123 For the four largest 
Part D drug plans, preferred pharmacies offered prescription 
drug prices that were about 8% less than the prices offered by 
non-preferred pharmacies.124 
                                                          
 115. See id. 
 116. Visante, supra note 48, at 6–10. 
 117. See id. at 10. 
 118. Id. at 14, 21. 
 119. See id. at 9–10. 
 120. Id. at 14. 
 121. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PART D CLAIMS 
ANALYSIS: NEGOTIATED PRICING BETWEEN PREFERRED AND NON-PREFERRED 
PHARMACY NETWORKS (2013), available at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/Downloads/
PharmacyNetwork.pdf; see also Adam Fein, New CMS Study: Preferred 
Pharmacy Networks Are Cheaper (Except When They’re Not), DRUG CHANNELS 
(July 11, 2013), http://www.drugchannels.net/2013/07/new-cms-study-
preferred-pharmacy_11.html (discussing the CMS study about “preferred 
pharmacy networks in Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs)”). 
 122. See Fein, supra note 121. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. (“The four biggest plans, accounting for 93% of claims, had 
average savings of 8% at preferred pharmacies.”). 
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Other studies have empirically tested the impact of AWP 
or FOC laws that limit selective contracting on healthcare and 
pharmaceutical spending.125 One study found an increase in 
overall healthcare spending in states that passed stringent 
AWP laws.126 Another study examining pharmacy-specific AWP 
laws found increased pharmaceutical spending in states that 
passed AWP laws that limited exclusive pharmacy networks.127 
In a recent study of the impact of AWP and FOC laws on health 
care spending, Professors Klick and Wright found that these 
laws are associated with an overall increase in health care 
spending of at least 3%.128 Moreover, they found that AWP and 
FOC laws increase pharmaceutical drug spending by 5.8%.129 
Thus, the empirical findings support the economic theory 
behind selective contracting in pharmaceutical markets.130 As 
pharmacies compete to be part of exclusive pharmacy 
networks, they reduce prices for many drugs, which reduces 
spending costs associated with pharmaceuticals.131 Laws that 
limit exclusive networks restrict the ability of PBMs and drug 
plans to negotiate discounts with pharmacies.132 These laws 
lead to increases in spending on pharmaceuticals.133 
B. THE EFFECT OF PHARMACY NETWORKS ON CUSTOMER 
ACCESS 
Opponents of pharmacy networks also allege that selective 
contracting reduces consumers’ access to care because 
consumers can only visit specific network pharmacies.134 They 
argue that PBMs or drug plans that severely limit the number 
of pharmacies in their network may impose a cost on 
consumers that have to travel significant distances to reach a 
                                                          
 125. See Vita, supra note 4, at 955. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Durrance, supra note 46, at 409. 
 128. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 11. 
 129. Id. at 13. 
 130. For a discussion of the economic theory behind selective contracting, 
see supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 131. E.g., Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4. 
 132. See id. at 1. 
 133. Id. at 6. 
 134. Cf. Letter from Balto to Cuomo, supra note 97, at 3 (“Consumers want 
choice and availability of numerous alternative pharmacies.”). 
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network pharmacy.135 However, there are several reasons to 
believe that exclusive pharmacy networks do not create access 
to care problems.136 First, drug plans and PBMs compete 
intensely for contracts with health plan sponsors and 
consumers.137 A drug plan or PBM that did not offer the 
accessibility that consumers wanted in their pharmacy network 
would lose business to other competitors that provided more 
accessibility.138 Thus, competition among drug plans and PBMs 
compels them to offer the amount of accessibility that 
consumers prefer.139 
The FTC has determined that competitive forces ensure 
that restricted networks will not significantly limit consumers’ 
access to pharmacies: 
Limitations on choice are unlikely to be so severe that consumers’ 
access to pharmacy services is inadequate. Just as competitive 
forces encourage pharmacies to offer their best price and service 
combination to a payer to gain access to its subscribers, 
competition also encourages payers (and employers) to establish 
pharmacy service arrangements that offer the level of accessibility 
that subscribers prefer.140 
Indeed, empirical evidence confirms that competitive networks 
offer many choices and do not restrict consumers’ access to 
pharmacies. In its own empirical examination, the FTC 
concluded that “[m]ost PBMs contract with 90 percent of the 
retail pharmacies,” and nearly all of the retail chain 
pharmacies in the regions that they serve.141 In fact, in the 
next section I show that the largest PBM includes over 93% of 
retail pharmacies in its network.142 Moreover, evidence 
suggests that consumers do not value accessibility as much as 
                                                          
 135. Morrisey, supra note 5, at 201 (“If managed care means selective 
contracting . . . the implication is that subscribers may be traveling further for 
care as managed care plans range further afield seeking lower prices.”). 
 136. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, In the Matter of Caremark Rx, 
Inc./AdvancePCS (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/cases/2004/02/040211ftcstatement0310239.pdf. 
 137. See FED. TRADE COMM’N., supra, note 107, ch. 7, at 15. 
 138. See Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 5 (discussing how 
different customers will want different things and how “competition also 
encourages payers . . . to establish pharmacy service arrangements that offer 
the level of accessibility that subscribers prefer”). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 107, ch. 7, at 12. 
 142. See infra Part IV. 
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they do lower prices.143 PBMs and drug plans typically offer 
different networks of pharmacies that vary in their degree of 
exclusivity and, in turn, the prices that consumers pay for 
pharmaceuticals.144 Consumers that value expanded 
accessibility and choice of pharmacy can choose broader 
networks, while consumers that prioritize lower drug prices 
over expansive accessibility can choose narrow or preferred 
networks.145 Empirical evidence shows that, when confronted 
with different plan options that vary in their degree of provider 
choice and price, most consumers choose the options that offer 
fewer provider choices but at a lower price.146 
The FTC has reiterated that many consumers prefer lower 
prices over increased accessibility: 
Not all consumers . . . will necessarily desire such broad access if 
this expanded access is costly. Many employers offer a choice 
between higher cost, higher benefit plans, and lower cost, lower 
benefit plans, and many employees choose the latter. Consumer 
preference for such programs presumably means that, in at least 
some consumers’ view, the advantages of lower premiums and/or 
lower out-of-pocket costs outweigh the disadvantages of limiting 
the choice of provider.147 
Thus, competition among drug plans and PBMs compels them 
to offer the amount of accessibility that consumers prefer; drug 
plans and PBMs that did not offer the desired level of 
accessibility would lose out in the competitive market.148 
Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that pharmacy networks 
have almost no effect on most consumers’ access to pharmacies; 
the overwhelming majority of consumers live near retail 
pharmacies that are included in exclusive pharmacy 
networks.149 Moreover, most consumers prefer more exclusive 
                                                          
 143. Anna Wilde Mathews, Price, Price, Price: Health-Insurance Shoppers 
Have Priorities, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887323300004578555560447477062.html. 
 144. See Letter from FTC to Kilgore, supra note 47, at 5–6. 
 145. See, e.g., Visante, supra note 48, at 4. 
 146. See, e.g., Beaulieu, supra note 20, at 60; Dennis P. Scanlon et al., The 
Impact of Health Plan Report Cards on Managed Care Enrollment, 21 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 19, 36 (2002); Mathews, supra note 143. 
 147. Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 5 (citation omitted). 
 148. See id. 
 149. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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networks that restrict access to some pharmacies but provide 
pharmaceuticals at lower prices.150 
IV. CASE STUDY: PHARMACY NETWORKS                         
OF EXPRESS SCRIPTS 
To confirm the predictions of economic theory, the 
conclusions of previous empirical studies, and the assertions of 
the FTC, I obtained proprietary data from Express Scripts,151 
the largest PBM in the United States.152 No prior study has 
ever reported or analyzed this data or similar data from 
another PBM to explore how pharmacy networks work in 
practice.153 In this section, I explain what the data reveals 
about the exclusivity of pharmacy networks, the cost savings 
generated by the networks, and consumers’ access to care 
under the networks. 
Express Scripts manages more than one billion 
prescriptions each year for more than one hundred million 
people.154 The company’s clients include “managed care 
organizations, health insurers, third-party administrators, 
employers, union-sponsored benefit plans, workers’ 
compensation plans and government health programs.”155 
Express Scripts acts as an intermediary between its clients, 
covered individuals, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and retail 
pharmacies.156 Like other PBMs, Express Scripts incorporates 
several practices that reduce the costs associated with 
prescription drug spending: establishing networks of local 
pharmacies where members can obtain medication based on 
their pharmacy benefit design; developing drug formularies 
                                                          
 150. See Mathews, supra note 143 (“[T]he focus on price . . . is a constant. 
Consulting firm Booz & Co.’s pretend exchanges showed that premiums were 
the most important factor in plan selection . . . .”). 
 151. See Express Scripts, supra note 18. 
 152. Top 10 Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies and Market Share 
by Membership, as of 2nd Quarter 2011, PHARMACY BENEFIT MGMT. INST., 
https://www.pbmi.com/PBMmarketshare1.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 153. Based on the Author’s review of the literature and industry reports. 
 154. The Atlantic’s Take on Our Fight to End Rx Abuse, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 
http://lab.express-scripts.com/pharmacy-waste/the-atlantics-take-on-our-fight-
to-end-rx-abuse/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
 155. EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING CO., FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT 57 
(2013) [hereinafter FORM 10-K]; available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1532063/000119312513063930/d450292d10k.htm. 
 156. See About Us, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, http://www.express-scripts.com/
aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
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and negotiating discounts and rebates from drug 
manufacturers; providing access to mail order pharmacies;157 
evaluating prescribing patterns to ensure consumers obtain 
appropriate drugs for the lowest price;158 and processing claims 
for their health plan sponsor clients.159 
Express Scripts has provided data about the pharmacy 
networks it has developed for its clients. Express Scripts 
provided only aggregate data about the percentage of 
pharmacies included in the different networks, the proximity of 
network pharmacies to covered individuals, and cost savings 
among the different networks.160 The data included no 
identifying variables because of the confidential nature of 
individual client contracts.161 The Express Scripts data is 
current as of July 17, 2013.162 
Express Scripts offers various network options to its 
clients.163 Although some clients require a customized network 
to meet their specific needs and population of covered 
individuals, many clients choose from Express Scripts’ 
standard network options.164 The options vary in how many 
pharmacies are included in a network, and in turn, in the cost 
savings they generate for clients.165 There are approximately 
70,000 retail pharmacies in the United States.166 Express 
Scripts’ broad network option includes over 93% of all retail 
pharmacies, while their standard narrow network option 
includes approximately 81% of all retail pharmacies in the 
network.167 Table 1 reports the percentage of pharmacies 
                                                          
 157. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at i. 
 158. E.g., id. at 7–10. 
 159. E.g., id. at 2 n.3. 
 160. Express Scripts, supra note 18. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Services, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, http://www.express-scripts.com/
services/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
 164. See FORM 10-K, supra note 155, at 6; Express Scripts, supra note 18. 
This observation is also based on the Author’s discussion with representatives 
of Express Scripts. 
 165. See Services, supra note 163; Express Scripts, supra note 18. 
 166. See Michael Taitel et al., Pharmacists as Immunization Providers: 
Patient Attitudes and Perceptions, PHARMACY TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/2011/September2011/Phar
macists-as-Immunization-Providers-Patient-Attitudes-and-Perceptions. 
 167. Express Scripts, supra note 18. The primary difference between the 
two network options is that the standard narrow network excludes one large 
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included in Express Scripts’ standard networks in urban areas, 
suburban areas, and rural areas.168 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Pharmacies Included in Express 
Scripts’ Standard Network Options 
 
 % of Total 
Urban 
Pharmacies 
% of Total 
Suburban 
Pharmacies 
% of Total 
Rural 
Pharmacies 
Standard Broad 
Network 92.1% 94.1% 94.9% 
Standard Narrow 
Network169 77.1% 78.5% 85.0% 
 
As basic economic theory would predict, Express Scripts 
generates greater savings for clients who choose more exclusive 
network options. Pharmacies compete to be part of Express 
Scripts’ exclusive networks by offering discounts and other 
price concessions for prescription drugs.170 As a result, Express 
                                                          
national retail chain pharmacy. Id. When this large chain is disregarded, the 
narrow network still includes 92% of all other retail pharmacies in the 
network. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. If the large national chain is disregarded, the percentage of 
pharmacies included in Express Scripts’ standard narrow network rises 
substantially, as illustrated by the table below. Id. 
 
 % of Total 
Urban 
Pharmacies 
% of Total 
Suburban 
Pharmacies 
% of Total 
Rural 
Pharmacies 
Standard Narrow 
Network (excluding a 
national chain not 
included in the 
Narrow Network) 
90.3% 92.6% 94.0% 
 
 170. Id.; see EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2013), available 
at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=69641&p=irol-reportsAnnual 
(“We believe the primary competitive factors in the industry include the 
ability to contract with retail pharmacies to ensure our retail pharmacy 
networks meet the needs of our clients and their members, the ability to 
negotiate discounts on prescription drugs with drug manufacturers, the ability 
to navigate the complexities of governmental reimbursed business, including 
Medicare Part D, Medicaid and the Public Exchanges, the ability to manage 
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Scripts’ clients who use more exclusive networks pay less when 
prescriptions are filled at in-network pharmacies.171 Although 
exact cost savings depend on both the specific prescription 
drugs covered by the clients’ drug plan and the pharmacies 
included in the network, in general, clients choosing the 
standard narrow network pay approximately 1% less for 
prescription drugs than they would pay if they chose the broad 
network offering.172 
Moreover, some of Express Scripts’ clients choose an option 
that includes a preferred set of pharmacies within a pharmacy 
network.173 Under these preferred network plans, covered 
individuals can fill prescriptions at any pharmacy within the 
network, but they will pay less (through lower co-pays) at the 
preferred pharmacies within that network.174 Because the 
preferred network is more exclusive than even the narrow 
network, Express Scripts’ clients that choose this option save 
approximately 4.5% of prescription drug costs compared to 
clients that choose only the broadest retail network.175 Table 2 
summarizes the average savings that Express Scripts’ clients 
achieve for the different network options.176 
 
Table 2: Cost Savings for Various Pharmacy Networks 
Offered by Express Scripts 
 
 Savings compared to Standard 
Broad Network 
Standard Broad Network — 
Standard Narrow Network approximately 1% 
Preferred Network Option approximately 4.5% 
 
Finally, to address concerns that more exclusive networks 
reduce consumers’ access to care because they can only visit 
                                                          
cost and quality of specialty drugs, the ability to utilize the information we 
obtain about drug utilization patterns and consumer behavior to reduce costs 
for our clients and members, and the level of service that we provide.”). 
 171. Express Scripts, supra note 18. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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specific network pharmacies, I obtained Express Scripts’ data 
on the distance between network pharmacies and covered 
individuals. The CMS has established access standards that 
ensure pharmacy networks have a sufficient number of retail 
pharmacies so patients have convenient access to drugs.177 The 
CMS has established that “convenient access” implies that 
individuals living in an urban area live within two miles of a 
network pharmacy, individuals living in a suburban area live 
within five miles of a network pharmacy, and individuals living 
in a rural area live within fifteen miles of a network 
pharmacy.178 The CMS requires that networks provide the 
defined convenient access to pharmacies for 90% of their urban 
and suburban covered individuals and 70% of their rural 
covered individuals.179 
Table 3 reports the percentage of individuals covered 
under Express Scripts’ standard broad network and standard 
narrow network that have convenient access to network 
pharmacies, as defined by the CMS.180 Although the narrow 
network offers convenient access to slightly less of the covered 
population, both of Express Scripts’ networks far exceed the 
CMS requirements for convenient access.181 Regardless of 
whether they live in urban, suburban, or rural areas, over 98% 
of the individuals covered under Express Scripts’ networks 
have convenient access to network pharmacies.182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 177. See, e.g., Memorandum from Cynthia Tudor, Director, Medicare Drug 
Benefit & C&D Data Grp. 1 (Dec. 22, 2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/
Downloads/HPMSMEMORetailHIAccess.pdf. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Express Scripts, supra note 18. 
 181. Compare id. (reporting convenient access to pharmacies for over 98% 
of covered individuals in all cases), with Memorandum from Cynthia Tudor, 
supra note 177 (requiring convenient access for 90% of urban and suburban 
covered individuals and 70% of rural covered individuals). 
 182. Express Scripts, supra note 18. 
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Table 3: Percentage of Covered Individuals with 
“Convenient Access” to Network Pharmacies 
 
 Individuals 
Living in 
Urban Areas 
Individuals 
Living in 
Suburban 
Areas 
Individuals 
Living in Rural 
Areas 
CMS requirement 
for convenient 
access 
90% 90% 70% 
Express Scripts’ 
Standard Broad 
Network 
98.9% 99.7% 98.1% 
Express Scripts’ 
Standard Narrow 
Network 
98.5% 99.6% 98.0% 
 
Thus, data from Express Scripts, the nation’s largest PBM, 
reveals that exclusive pharmacy networks operate exactly as 
economic theory would predict. Pharmacies compete to be part 
of exclusive networks that will bring them more customers by 
offering discounts for prescription drugs. As a result, Express 
Scripts’ customers that choose more exclusive network options 
pay less for the prescription drug costs of their covered 
individuals.183 Moreover, concerns about access to care are 
largely unfounded: far more individuals covered under Express 
Scripts’ networks have convenient access to network 
pharmacies than would be required under governmental 
standards.184 This result demonstrates how the intense 
competition among PBMs for sophisticated clients ensures that 
PBMs will offer the accessibility that consumers want in their 
pharmacy networks. Thus, well-designed pharmacy networks 
can more than satisfy customer convenience and lower the cost 
of healthcare. 
CONCLUSION 
All available evidence suggests that the benefits of 
pharmacy networks clearly exceed the costs. Using the 
                                                          
 183. See supra notes 170–76 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra Table 3. 
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principles of economic theory, the conclusions of previous 
empirical studies, the determinations of the FTC, and 
proprietary data from the largest pharmacy benefit manager in 
the United States, I find that pharmacy networks significantly 
lower the cost of prescription drugs for drug plans and 
consumers. When drug plans have the ability to exclude 
pharmacies from their network and steer patients elsewhere, 
pharmacies compete aggressively for selective contracts by 
offering price discounts for filling prescriptions. In general, 
more exclusive networks produce greater competition because 
they promise to channel more patients to network pharmacies. 
As a result, more exclusive networks generate even steeper 
price discounts. 
However, because these cost savings come at the expense 
of both the pharmacies that must offer price discounts to be 
part of exclusive networks and the pharmacies that are 
excluded, pharmacy networks are unpopular among retail 
pharmacies. As a result, pharmacy representatives have 
alleged various harms created by network pharmacies. Their 
primary argument is that networks reduce consumers’ access to 
care by limiting their choice of pharmacies. Responding to 
these arguments, many states and the federal government 
have enacted regulations that limit the ability of health 
insurers and/or prescription drug plans to contract selectively. 
Further, I find that concerns about consumers’ access to 
care are largely unfounded. Competition among drug plans and 
PBMs compels them to offer the amount of accessibility that 
consumers prefer; drug plans and PBMs that did not offer the 
desired level of accessibility would lose out in the competitive 
market. As a result, the overwhelming majority of consumers 
live near retail pharmacies that are included in exclusive 
pharmacy networks. 
The conclusions of this analysis are critical for 
policymakers considering further limitations on selective 
contracting in healthcare. Well-designed pharmacy networks 
provide customer convenience and lower the cost of prescription 
drugs. It would be reckless for states to enact regulations that 
would undo these cost savings and increase prescription drug 
prices in our current state of ever-increasing healthcare costs. 
